Law Office Of Paul DePetris

Jeep Cherokee Lemon -- On May 3, 1997, the Jeep owners leased a new 1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee.

Several warranty repairs were performed between May 1997 and February 1998 and are not the basis for the

Jeep owners’ Lemon Law claim.    One of the Jeep owners testified that she first experienced severe shaking

of the entire vehicle and almost lost control of the vehicle on the highway on January 3, 1998, while driving

her mother to a doctor's appointment. After pulling off the road, turning off the engine, and then restarting it,

one of the Jeep owners was able to continue her trip. She drove the vehicle to the dealer the same day, but

the dealer's mechanic was unable to reproduce the condition in a test-drive, and there was no written record

of that service visit. The Jeep owners’ mother testified and corroborated the Jeep owners’ version of the

incident.     On February 27, 1998, when the vehicle had traveled 14,723 miles, one of the Jeep owners again

experienced severe shaking and vibration of the vehicle which impaired her control. One of the Jeep owners

brought the vehicle to the dealer and also reported an inoperable brakelight. The dealer diagnosed a loose

steering box and a chafed brake light wire.  The severe vibration occurred again. This time, the vehicle began

to shake badly while one of the Jeep owners was negotiating a curve in the road. The brake light also failed

again, and both conditions led one of the Jeep owners to return to the dealer on March 27, 1998. The dealer

again replaced the steering box and ordered a new module for the brake light. The severe vibration in the car

occurred again the same day.  One of the Jeep owners returned to the dealer with the same two complaints

on April 14. The dealer installed a new brake light module, but claimed to be unable to reproduce the

vibration while test-driving the vehicle. Both conditions occurred again, and one of the Jeep owners returned

to the dealer on May 21, 1998.  This time the dealer found a leak in the steering damper and a short in the

brake light wiring. Both defective parts were replaced. One of the Jeep owners testified that the vibration

condition then improved substantially, from a "ten" on a scale of one to ten to a "one or two," although there

were still intermittent incidents of vibration in the steering wheel. After the May 21 repairs, the vehicle itself

no longer vibrated severely so as to threaten loss of control, and the brake light functioned properly.  On May

28, 1998, the jeep owners’ attorney filed a lawsuit against Chrysler Corporation alleging substantial defects

and nonconformities in the vehicle.  After a jury verdict for the Jeep owners, the trial judge announced that

judgment would be entered against defendant, Chrysler Corporation, for the adjusted lease price of a 1997

Jeep Cherokee under the New Jersey Automobile Lemon Law, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 to -49 (the Lemon Law). The

judge denied Chrysler’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. On appeal, the

appellate court rejected Chrysler’s argument that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.   In

support of its argument that it was error to deny its motion for a new trial, Chrysler claimed that since one of

the Jeep owners testified that the vibration was first reported in January, but the jury found that any

nonconformity was first reported at 14,723 miles (the mileage in February when the brake light problem was

first reported), the jury must have found only the brake light, and not the vibration, to be the substantial

defect under the Lemon Law.   Chrysler argued that a brake light cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a

Lemon Law nonconformity. Assuming (without deciding) that a defective brake light alone would not support

a Lemon Law claim, the appellate court reject Chrysler’s assertion that the jury verdict could not stand.   For,

there was sufficient credible evidence that "reasonable minds might accept . . . as adequate to support" the

jury's conclusion that a nonconformity remained after attempted repairs in February, March, and April, and

that the unrepaired defects continued for an unreasonable period of time.  The jury apparently believed the

Jeep owners’ testimony concerning the repeated, unrepaired problems with the vehicle.  There was no

dispute that the vehicle's spontaneous and excessive vibration was diagnosed on May 21 as a defective

steering damper and repaired on that date, along with the malfunctioning brake light. Moreover, the

testimony of Chrysler’s expert automobile mechanic, could be understood to support the Jeep owner’s

testimony that the vibration and loss of steering control that she experienced in February,March, April, and

May (and perhaps in January as well) were caused by the defective damper problem that was diagnosed on

May 21, 1998, and constituted a substantial impairment under the Lemon Law.      As the Jeep owners’

attorney asked the jury rhetorically in his closing argument, "If you have a car that you cannot control on the

road, is it reasonable to take from January 3rd to May to repair it, May 21st, is that reasonable? . . . Is that

reasonable to drive a vehicle from February until May without brake lights?" The jury was instructed to

consider whether the manufacturer, through its authorized dealer, was unable to accomplish the repairs for

an unreasonable period. The jury had to decide whether the defective conditions of the vehicle, namely the

intermittent, severe vibration that affected control of the car, along with the malfunctioning brake light,

continued for an unreasonable period of time without the manufacturer being able to repair, and if so

whether those defects substantially impaired the value, use, or safety of the vehicle. The jury answered "yes"

to both questions, and we are satisfied that there was sufficient credible evidence to support the jury's

answers.   The appellate court was satisfied that there was no error of law that unfairly prejudiced the jury's

verdict and no miscarriage of justice.  Accordingly the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s verdict in favor

of the jeep owners.

Toyota Corolla Lemon -- The New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs found after a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge that a 1991 Toyota Corolla was a "lemon" under the New Car Lemon Law.   Toyota

appealed, contending that the wrong standard was applied and that the decision was "logically incoherent"

and "contrary to the weight of the evidence."   The appellate court disagreed with Toyota and affirmed the

decision that the car was a lemon.  On April 4, 1991, the consumer leased and took delivery of a 1991 Toyota

Corolla. On November 19, 1991, her vehicle stalled and could not be restarted. It was towed to the dealer.

Similar problems occurred in December 1991 and January 1992.  The stalling occurred when the car was

parked in her driveway facing downward at an angle of approximately thirty degrees and the car had less

than a half tank of gas.  Toyota's field technical administrator testified that if the fuel level of the tank is low

enough and the grade is steep enough, then the problem may arise. He testified that this problem would not

impair safety but did impair the car's use.  The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the manufacturer's

fuel system had: a design defect which substantially impairs the use, safety and value of the vehicle to this

consumer. Although respondent seeks to trivialize the importance of the problem by stating it operated within

factory standards or represented it as normal, the evidence clearly shows that the failure to start not only

interferes with the owner's enjoyment and use of her new car, but will affect its safety and value.

Furthermore, the proofs amply demonstrate that the petitioner's response to the problem is not unduly

demanding. Any reasonable person would be likely to act similarly. The problem is not one that every buyer

must tolerate within the intendment of the Lemon Law.  The Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs

adopted as her final decision the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge.  Toyota

contended that to prove that a car is a lemon the consumer must establish a violation of a warranty.  Toyota

argued that the "manifest intention of the statute as a whole is to enforce the warranties, and these

warranties, be they express or implied, do not reach every condition, defective or otherwise, which might

impair a vehicle's use, value or safety, for any particular consumer."  The appellate court disagreed with such

a restrictive interpretation. The Legislature in enacting the Lemon Law statute recognized that the purchase

of an automobile is "a major high cost consumer transaction," and that "the inability to correct defects in

these vehicles creates a major hardship and an unacceptable economic burden on the consumer."   The

"intent" of the Lemon Law is to "provide procedures to expeditiously resolve disputes between a consumer

and a manufacturer when defects in a new motor vehicle are not corrected within a reasonable time," and to

provide "specific remedies where the uncorrected defect substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the

new motor vehicle." Toyota's construction of the statute would turn this expeditious administrative

proceeding into a full blown litigation entangling the consumer in the intricacies of design defects and other

complexities of product liability law. The Legislature clearly intended to spare the unfortunate buyer of a

"lemon" those hazards and costs.  The Legislature's concern for the consumer is further demonstrated by its

creation of a statutory presumption for the consumer.  The consumer in this case presented her car to Toyota

at least three times for repair of the nonconformity, but the nonconformity persisted. Consequently, the

consumer is entitled to the statutory presumption that Toyota is unable to repair or correct the

nonconformity.  Toyota contends that the Division of Consumer Affairs improperly used a subjective standard,

namely consumer satisfaction, and that an objective standard should be used in determining whether the

defect or nonconformity substantially impairs the use, value or safety of the car. However, even under

warranty law whether a defect or nonconformity substantially impairs the use or value of the goods to a

buyer is not purely "objective." It may be "personalized in the sense that the facts must be examined from

the viewpoint of the buyer and his circumstances, objective in the sense that the criterion is what a

reasonable person in the buyer position would have believed." An important factor is whether the

nonconformity "shakes the buyer's confidence" in the goods. The purchase of a new car is a major

investment "rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from its dependability and safety."  A reasonable

person in the consumers position could readily conclude that a condition in which a car stalls and won't

restart when parked on an incline impairs the use and value of the car and shakes her confidence in it.  The

appellate court found that the agency's decision was supported by substantial credible evidence, was

consistent with legislative intent, and was clearly not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and therefore had

to be sustained.

Nissan Lemon Claim Dismissal Reversed  -- The lessee of a Nissan automobile took delivery of the

Nissan from the dealer, Warnock, on July 18, 1995.  On October 6, 1995, when the vehicle had 2,019 miles

on it, the consumer was driving it between 55 and 60 miles per hour on Interstate Route 78 when the vehicle

began to buck, all the panel lights came on, and the vehicle stalled. She was able to restart the vehicle and

continue her journey. The vehicle stalled on several occasions for the remainder of her trip to downtown

Newark, and from there it was towed to Warnock. Warnock had the vehicle from October 6 to October 27

and attempted to repair it. On November 2, 1995, five days later, the consumer was driving to her sister's

house in Hillside when she experienced bucking and stalling. Again, all the panel lights came on. The vehicle

was again towed to Warnock where a repair was attempted. The consumer retrieved her vehicle on

November 8.      On November 13, 1995, while she was travelling on Interstate 78, the vehicle bucked and

then stalled. She was able to restart it after fifteen minutes and drive the vehicle. It stalled again, followed by

another restart, followed by another stall and restart. The vehicle was towed to Warnock.    The vehicle

stalled on February 23, 1996, and on  February 24, 1996, The consumer wrote her "last chance" letter to

Nissan. N.J.S.A. 56:12-33b. She had received no response by March 1, 1996 when the vehicle stalled again.

The car was taken to Warnock and a Nissan representative told her that they were not able to duplicate the

problem. The consumer testified that it stalled on June 4 and was in Warnock's service center from June 11

to June 24. She also testified that it stalled on July 13, 1996. The hearing before the Administrative Law

Judge was on September 4, 1996 and, at that time, the mileage was 12,800.   The consumer further testified

that the problem occurred in wet and rainy weather and that Warnock finally had told her that it was not

going to touch the car because it could not duplicate the problem.    The consumer’s expert qualified as an

expert in automotive repair and computer diagnosis. The consumer’s expert testified that weather is a

primary problem with electronic systems in modern-day vehicles. According to the consumer’s expert, damp

moist days can have an adverse effect on electronics because moist air can get into a circuit if it has not been

sealed properly, thereby causing the circuit to malfunction. In addition to a defective weather seal on a

connector, other possible causes of a stalling problem are inadequate grounding or a defective connection. A

transmission problem can also cause the stalling phenomenon. According to the consumer’s expert, diagnosis

of these problems is often very difficult. The consumer’s expert ultimately opined that the cause of the

stalling was an electrical problem due to a poor ground or a faulty connection which will manifest itself on

wet and damp days. The consumer’s expert stated that the actual location of the problem may be impossible

to find. The consumer’s expert had been unable to duplicate the problem or to diagnose it more specifically. 

Nissan's sole witness was employed by Nissan as a dealer technical specialist, and he assists dealers in the

diagnosis and repair of difficult to repair vehicles. He provides the dealers with technical information. Nissan’s

expert drove the consumer' vehicle twice because the dealership asked him for help. He could not duplicate

the condition, and a computer diagnosis of the car's electronic system resulted in no positive findings. He

agreed, however, that the computer would not detect mechanical failures. At one point in his testimony, he

appeared to assume that there was, in fact, a problem and testified that he could not say with one hundred

percent assurance that it was an electrical problem. However, he finally testified that because he was not

able to duplicate the problem, he was satisfied that there is no problem.     On cross-examination, he

admitted that he had experience with stalling vehicles where the cause of the problem was not detected by

the computerized diagnosis. He also conceded that it is possible for a circuit to open temporarily and then

close, in which event the computer would not detect a problem.     In a written initial decision, the

Administrative Law Judge rejected the consumer' claim and the Director of the Division adopted the

Administrative Law Judge's initial decision as his final decision.  On appeal, the court noted that the threshold

issue was whether the Nissan had a defect, i.e., whether the stalling and bucking difficulties described by the

consumer occurred.  Resolution of that issue required an assessment of the consumer' credibility and the

credibility of her husband, who corroborated her testimony. If the credibility issue is resolved in favor of the

consumer, then the issue was whether the defect described by them constitutes a "nonconformity" as defined

in the New Car Lemon Law.   The appellate court explained that the Administrative Law Judge ruled that

there can be no finding of a defect in the absence of expert testimony establishing its cause.  If the

consumers are determined to have been credible, then their testimony established objective facts, the

bucking and stalling of their vehicle on the specified dates. While their testimony may not have been of a

technical nature, it was not subjective.  Overturning the Administrative Law Judge’s dismissal of the

consumer’s case, the appellate court concluded that the absence of corroborating expert testimony is not

fatal to a claim, though such testimony may be relevant regarding the credibility of the owner/lessee's

allegations and other issues.    The first issue is whether the defect described by the consumer exists.

Resolution of this issue requires a determination of the credibility of Mr. and The consumer. In resolving the

credibility issue, expert testimony is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive. If it is determined that the

defect exists, the next issue is whether the defect qualifies as a "nonconformity" under the New Car Lemon

Law.  If so, then the claimant is entitled to a refund pursuant to the Lemon Law.  Accordingly, the appellate

court reversed the Agency's final decision and directed that a new hearing be held on the consumer’s Lemon

claim.

Nissan Frontier Declared a Lemon – On September 20, 2002, the consumer purchased a 2002 Nissan Frontier showing 26 miles on the odometer.  On November 13, 2003, the consumer noticed a problem with his power steering and returned the vehicle to the Nissan dealership for repair (with an odometer reading of 11,420 miles).   The Nissan dealership ordered a power steering pump. On December 4, 2003, the consumer returned his vehicle to the Nissan dealership and the power steering pump was replaced.   However, the consumer observed that the power steering problem still existed in his vehicle.  On December 19, 2003, the consumer returned to the Nissan dealership and again sought repair of the power steering problem in his vehicle. The consumer was told that a hose with a pressure switch was ordered.  On February 10, 2004, the consumer again returned to the Nissan dealership still experiencing and complaining of problems with the power steering in his vehicle. The dealership ordered a power steering gear.  On February 12, 2004, the consumer sent a ten-day Lemon Law notice letter to Nissan North America advised Nissan of the power steering difficulties as well as the several failed attempts to remedy the problem.  Nissan received the consumer's ten-day notice letter and Nissan did not repair the vehicle within the ten-day period beginning on February 18, 2004. Neither Nissan nor any Nissan dealership made a good faith, diligent attempt to remedy the condition complained of (power steering problems) during the ten-day Lemon Law period. The consumer received no contact or communication from Nissan (or any of its dealerships) during the ten-day period.   The judge found that the vehicle was a lemon, noting that a vehicle that exhibits such a wide variation in the amount of effort required to turn it (when making a left turn as opposed to a right turn) does pose a significant danger to the user and to others on the highway as one would attempt to navigate in traffic. It is, therefore, a substantial diminution of the safety element.  The judge awarded the consumer $23,735.14 and attorney’s fees of $2,742.99.

Lincoln Aviator 4 door sedan declared Lemon -- Petitioner leased a Lincoln Aviator 4 door sedan from Holman Lincoln Mercury on February 14, 2004.  The vehicle had been driven 13 miles as of the date of delivery and at the time of the lemon law it had approximately 17600 miles.  Shortly after the date of delivery, petitioner experienced several problems including but not limited to, the air conditioning not producing cold air, heated seats not working, rear window stuck open, driver’s seat moving forward while the vehicle is in motion, rear lift gate opening while the vehicle is in motion, radio going on by itself and the blower fan increasing by itself. Petitioner's primary concerns are the lift gate opening and driver’s seat moving while the vehicle is in motion. These present safety concerns according to petitioner. Respondent's service and investigation of the alleged defects has been extensive. Between the period July 2004 and January 2005, the dealership and Ford have engaged in 7 inspections or repairs and test driven the vehicle over 200 miles. It has been in the possession of the dealership for over 25 days. Only one time was a defect duplicated and it was repaired. The lift gate assembly was replaced. The test drives, inspections and computer diagnostics have not yielded any evidence of a serious non-conformity. One explanation is the defects observed by petitioner are so intermittent that they are unable to be duplicated. But, these should be stored in the vehicle's computer system. If confirmed, a seat or lift gate malfunction are the types of non-conformities that could substantially impact the use, safety or value of the vehicle. If the lift gate malfunctions permitting property to fly out of the vehicle and/or distracts the driver, it could cause a serious accident. Similarly, if the driver's seat malfunctions as described by petitioner, it could cause the operator to lose control of the vehicle. The driver could be tightly pressed into the steering wheel, lose ability to properly steer the car, or lose the ability to properly operate the gas or brake pedal. These conditions, if true are dangerous and could cause an accident. However, in the present matter the respondent was unable to verify or duplicate the seat malfunction on numerous occasions. And, the lift gate was repaired on August 12, 2004.   The judge found that the fact petitioner has not driven the vehicle for any substantial period after the last chance repairs Ford made did not prevent her from establishing her Lemon Law claims.  The judge found that the seat and lift gate defects described by petitioner did occur. The consumer was credible and forthright. She had no reason to contrive these defects. Written statements were offered, confirming petitioner's and her sister's experiences with the seat and lift gate. The dealership confirmed defects with the lift gate after a few service attempts. Thus, petitioner's version of events was partially corroborated by the repair made on August 18, 2004, even though the defects were not found on August 3, 2004, or August 10, 2004.  Petitioner stated that she thoroughly enjoys the vehicle. She did not want a new vehicle, money or damages. Petitioner continued to pay the lease payments even while the car sat at the dealership lot for several months. She simply wanted the car fixed so as to restore her faith and confidence in its safety. Therefore the judge concluded that petitioner met her burden of proof. She offered reliable proof that her vehicle has defects that substantially impact its use and safety.

MINI Cooper S owner representing themselves lose lemon case -- The consumer purchased a 2002 MINI Cooper S from Prestige MINI (Prestige) on September 30, 2002.  When the consumer took delivery of the vehicle, the odometer reading on the vehicle was 10 miles.   As of the date of the commencement of the lemon law hearing, the odometer reading on the vehicle was 7,674 miles.   The consumer had six "repair visits" with regard to the vehicle. The first service of the vehicle by Prestige occurred on January 16, 2003, at which time the vehicle had 1,810 miles. Three concerns were raised. The service invoice reflects the customer's advice that the vehicle jerks with light throttle, mainly in second and third gears. At the lemon law, the customer described this concern as a "hesitation" or "bucking," which he first noticed in October 2002.  Prestige contacted the technical hotline and it was recommended that the DME be reprogrammed using the latest software version. No fault codes were found. The second issue involved the tires having a "flat spot." According to the service invoice, the tires have "slight flat spots when sitting over night," which "goes away after warmed up," and this occurred "especially when cold outside." At the lemon law, the customer described that the tires would vibrate for a few miles, which resulted in the vehicle shaking to the point that the images in the rear and side view mirrors were distorted. In response to this concern, the service manager at Prestige informed the customer that he would contact the tire manufacturer. An additional issue was raised regarding the driver's seat squeaking. According to the service invoice, this complaint could not be verified after an approximate eight-mile road test. The customer testified that after this service visit he went to Ramapo Tire with regard to the flat spot issue. According to the customer, he was told that the company was not equipped to work on "run flats." Subsequently the customer was referred to another tire dealer in New York.   The next service of the vehicle was on July 7, 2003, at which time the vehicle had 4,008 miles. During this service visit, the customer indicated the vehicle hesitates in second and third gears. The service invoice reflects that the DME program was not up to date and Prestige reprogrammed the DME, after which the vehicle test-drove well with no hesitation. The customer also complained of a noise in the right front end of the vehicle, which the customer described at the lemon law as a "knocking" noise. According to the service invoice, no noise was heard during a test drive. In connection with this service, the technician found the DCS and tire lights on, an issue that the customer did not raise. The service invoice reflects that Prestige determined that the steering angle sensor needed recalibration and, after recalibration, the DCS light did not illuminate. Another issue involved a solvent smell in the vehicle, which Prestige attributed to a leaking coolant expansion tank that was changed.  According to the customer, he drove the vehicle with the technician and later contacted the service manager, which culminated in a service appointment on July 18, 2003. As of the date of this service, the vehicle had 4,050 miles. With regard to this visit, the customer indicated that, since Prestige installed the new software, the car bucks in first gear. At the lemon law, the customer described that, in first gear, the engine cut out and then cut back, which caused the vehicle to buck. According to the service invoice, no codes related to the DME were stored, the DME was sent to Montvale to reprogram and the DME was installed. An additional concern related to the vehicle making noise over bumps. According to the service invoice, the front of the sunroof area would creak when driving over certain bumps. Prestige removed the inside sunroom trim, loosened four of the front sunroof cassette bolts and oiled the spots. The service invoice reflects the "creaking" did not return during the test drive. The next service transpired on August 6, 2003, at which time the vehicle had 4,472 miles. The customer's complaints related to the hesitation in second and third gears and the sunroof making a noise while driving. Prestige found the sunroof bolts in the front portion of the vehicle were loose. According to the service invoice, it tightened the bolts, test-drove the vehicle and the noise was gone. With regard to the hesitation, the customer testified that the service manager indicated his intention to contact the technical hotline. The service invoice reflects that Prestige spoke with a representative. The invoice states "Working on a fix. Nothing they can do at this time." In or around August 22, 2003, the customer sent an e-mail correspondence to a representative of the MINI Division, Customer Relations, regarding notice of a final repair attempt "to remedy hesitation/bucking in second and third gears." The correspondence noted, "[a]lso unresolved, is a vibration throughout the car caused by the tires flat spotting in temperatures below 65 degrees." According to the customer, he later spoke with this representative, who verbally declined his e-mail demand. Subsequently, the customer sent a letter, dated September 30, 2003, in which he made a written demand for relief under the Lemon Law. In the letter, the customer stated that he was enclosing e-mail correspondence and repair orders "concerning the engine hesitation and bucking in second and third gears, knocking noise from the right front, solvent smell in interior and DSC/tire monitor lights (which intermittently come one) which have plagued my MINI since purchase." The customer indicated that he had brought the vehicle back to Prestige four times "for the engine hesitation and bucking," and noted his communication concerning an unresolved "vibration throughout the car caused by the tires flat spotting in cooler temperatures." In response to this communication, a service visit transpired on October 14, 2003, at which time the vehicle had 4,905 miles. Although the service invoice reflects a complaint that the vehicle was hesitating and stalling when the customer tries to accelerate, the customer testified that he did not complain of any stalling. The MINI representative for Prestige, test drove the vehicle for 42 miles on highway and back roads at varying speeds and testified, and the invoice for service reflects, that he did not experience any abnormalities in the way the vehicle handled – no hesitation, pulsation or bucking when operating the vehicle. The service invoice reflects the MINI expert's conclusion that all of the complaints noted in the earlier service invoices "are normal characteristics of the vehicle." With regard to the customer's concern that the sunroof was noisy in the right front area, the MINI expert testified, and the service invoice reflects, that he heard no abnormal noises during his test drive. Only wind buffeting was heard when fully open at high speeds. The third matter involved the illumination of the DCS light and tire lights. The service invoice reflects that a code had been taken from the vehicle, after which Prestige replaced and aligned the steering angle sensor. The final concern related to all of the tires having flat spots. At the lemon law, The MINI expert confirmed that the tires flat spotted but testified that the vibration was not as severe as the customer described. During his test drive, The MINI expert felt a vibration in the steering wheel and through the seat, which stopped after a few miles. He did not observe the mirrors vibrating. The MINI expert explained that, because of the tire compound, the tires will flat spot if the vehicle sits overnight or in certain weather conditions. After the vehicle is driven for a period of time and the tire warms up, the flat spot goes away. The service invoice reflects that Prestige contacted an authorized Pirelli dealer and was informed that there was no defect in the tire. The MINI expert explained that, during his most recent test drive, he did not observe anything which confirmed the consumer’s complaints.  The judge found that the record was bereft of sufficient evidence demonstrating that the vehicle exhibits any unusual hesitation or bucking. In short, the customer's complaint was not substantiated by expert or other objective factual evidence. The customer's subjective opinion, without more, was insufficient to sustain the customer's required burden of proof as to the existence of a nonconformity. Apart from this, the customer's claim was overborne by the persuasive testimony of respondent's expert. From the evidence, this concern appears to be attributable to the customer's driving style, rather than any defect in the vehicle. Turning to the vibration of the vehicle, there did not appear to be any disagreement between the parties that this concern is attributable to flat spots on the tires in cool weather. Succinctly stated, this issue appears to be a matter within the purview of the tire manufacturer and not a defect in the vehicle. The only other issue raised in the customer's Lemon Law Dispute Resolution Application involved the "knocking" noise, which the customer acknowledged no longer existed.

2003 four door, Ford Freestar Limited Owners representing themselves lose lemon case -- The consumers purchased a 2003 four door Ford Freestar from the Ridgewood's Village Ford dealership in Ridgewood, New Jersey.  The odometer reading on the car on the date of delivery was 20 miles. The odometer reading on the vehicle as of the date of the lemon law was 12, 057 miles. The consumers testified at hearing that at that time the vehicle's dashboard navigation system was not working properly, although the dealership's technician testified that even though the system is an aftermarket accessory, which Ford did not manufacture, the system was working properly. There is no persuasive evidence of a malfunction with the navigation system. Had there been a malfunction the consumers surely would have included that as a defect in their application filed with the Division of Consumer Affairs, which they did not do. Indeed, there is no evidence that the repair order of September 3 is anything other than a preinspection report of the vehicle by the dealership, although the consumers had taken possession on August 30.   The vehicle's airbag dashboard light indicating a problem with the airbag system began to occasionally illuminate. The consumers testified that the vehicle manual urges owners to return the vehicle to the dealership for service when that occurs. They returned the vehicle for service. On October 10, 2003, a repair order states that the consumers reported the vehicle's airbag light was on for 10 days, but now was unlighted. The technician wrote that he could not verify through his tests that the light had been on, and while he found codes for the repair of such conditions, presumably in the Ford service manuals, he could not locate a definition. The airbag warning light system passed all tests and no problems were found at that time. It is also noted that on the same day, the technician reported that the rear lift gate was hard to open as reported by the consumers, but that he had to specially order new lift gate pistons. The consumers report no other problem with the lift gate. The vehicle was returned to the consumers the same day, October 10.  On November 11, 2003 a repair order shows that the consumers returned the vehicle to the dealership for installation of the pistons to the rear lift gate and because the "airbag light comes on intermittently." The service technician wrote that he removed and inspected connectors for the passenger airbag, that he tightened pins, and reattached everything. The technician concludes "All OK at this time." The vehicle was returned to the consumers the same day, November 11.   Sometime on or before December 1, 2003 the airbag light problem surfaced again for on that day, petitioner wrote a Last Chance Letter, claiming that the problem with the vehicle was the air bag warning light indicating a malfunction in the airbags and that while this light is lit the airbags are inoperable rendering the vehicle, from a safety perspective, inoperable while traveling.  The Ford dealership accepted the vehicle for repair of the safety bag light on December 4, 2003. While the repair order states the mileage of the vehicle as 3,050 on December 4, the service technician who explained he miscopied the mileage manually inserted the correct reading of 3900. The repair order states the following work was performed at Ridgewood's Village Ford:  Air bag light goes on. Light went on following morning after Reed [a service repair technician] insulated and grounded antenna wire. WDS Diag. Found codes for side airbag fault. Traced wires from seat to monitor. All OK. Installed test plug.cose still there.   Replaced diagnostic monitor. Cleaned connectors on both passenger and driver seats. Technician, service advisor and owner test drove. All OK at this time.  The vehicle was returned to the consumers December 12, 2003. The airbag light was apparently corrected to the consumers' satisfaction. Although the consumers did not carry through with their demand for a refund or a replacement vehicle, they determined they no longer wanted this vehicle because of the problems already presented. Nevertheless, the consumers did retake possession of their purchased vehicle on December 12, 2003.  The demands for repair set out by the consumers in their letter of December 1, 2003 were sufficiently satisfied by the manufacturer for them to forgo seeking relief at that time under the New Jersey Lemon Law, N.J.S.A. 56:12-29 - to 49.   At or near the beginning of June 2004, the dashboard brake light on the consumers' vehicle began to illuminate. According to the vehicle owner's manual, the light illumination suggests there may be a problem with the braking system. The consumers did as the manual suggested and returned the vehicle on June 4, 2004 to the dealership for repair. They testified that by this time they just wanted to get rid of this particular vehicle and get a replacement vehicle because they lost trust in it. On the same day, the consumers penned another letter to the manufacturer  alleging that the current problem with the vehicle was the select trac braking system and that the vehicle supposedly required a brake booster.   The dealership had to order and have delivered a brake booster kit which corrected the improper illumination of the light on the dashboard indicating a brake problem. The vehicle was out of service between June 4, the date of the Last Chance Letter, and June 22, 2004, a total of eighteen days. These 18 days, added to the prior 11 days, show the vehicle was out of service for 29 days, although the service center's records show that the vehicle was in the shop for 37 actual days of service, some of which were for regular maintenance. As an example, the evidence shows the vehicle was in the dealership's service center on March 5, 2004 for its 6000-mile check-up, and for body repair for which there is no further evidence, and for work on the engine, for which there is no further evidence.   The judge concluded that record was absent of persuasive evidence that during the time of the airbag dashboard light improper illumination that the airbags were inoperable. During the time of the trac braking system dashboard light improper illumination, the evidence does show the brakes did not fail at any time it was being operated by either petitioner.  One consumer testified the brakes did not fail to stop the vehicle as intended.   The judge found that the evidence in the record did not support the consumers' assertions that there was a `failure' of the airbag safety system and of the brake system. There is no evidence to show circumstances existed within which the airbags should have deployed and did not, or that the brakes should have stopped the vehicle but did not. Indeed, the consumers testified the brakes did not ever fail to stop the vehicle. What did fail were the warning lights on the dashboard that indicated there may be a problem with the airbags and that there may be a problem with the brakes; but, in neither case did either feature of the vehicle "fail" in the sense of not performing the function it was intended to perform.

Lexus SC 400 Owner Representing Themselves Lose Lemon Case – The Consumer purchased a Lexus SC 400 from Prestige Lexus of Ramsey, 955 Route 17 South, Ramsey, New Jersey with 40 miles. The odometer reading on the car as of the date of the lemon law hearing was 1,986 miles. The consumer claimed that he was pulling into a parking spot in front of his house and struck a small parked car because his brakes did not grab. After his brakes failed a second time that day, he called the dealership, Prestige Lexus of Ramsey, and brought his car in the following day. The dealership told him that it replaced the master cylinder and the brake actuator, but could not duplicate his complaint. The consumer also claimed that the consumer was exiting his garage in the path of oncoming traffic. The consumer claimed he pressed the brake pedal, but his car did not stop. His car allegedly just kept going and eventually skidded to a halt. After another visit to the dealer, the consumer claimed that he pulled up to a stop sign; he pressed on the brake and the car did not stop.   The consumer claimed he brought his car to the dealership for the third and last repair attempt on January 4, 2000 and that he left his car at the dealership until the date of this hearing because neither the dealership nor the manufacturer notified him about the results of that repair attempt. The judge found that the distance between the brake and gas pedal on consumer's Lexus SC400 is 2 inches or 57 millimeters, there are no federal or safety standards regarding width and height differential of brake pedals in cars, a survey of 40 different vehicles prepared by respondent reflects that the placement of brake and gas pedals vary both in width and height differential, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has not issued a recall for pedal placement for the vehicle and it had the same pedal cluster as every other similar model, that the consumer produced no proof that any consumer complaints have ever been received by NHTSA about pedal placement, that the consumer's car does not have a design defect, that the consumer's complaint can be rectified by moving his foot to the left a few inches to avoid depressing the brake and gas pedals simultaneously, that the consumer road tested a number of vehicles at the dealership before he purchased the vehicle, that the consumer made a bad choice and bought a car that does not suit his unique driving habits and finally, that the consumer complained about a design defect only on January 4, 2000 and thus, that the dealership did not have three repair attempts to correct a design defect even if such a correction could be made.  The judge found that the vehicle was designed by the manufacturer for the average driver and that the consumer's complaints appear to be subjective based upon his own unique driving habits, while he produced no proof that the vehicle was a safety hazard because of pedal placement. The judge concluded that the consumer's car may not be designed to his liking but it was not defectively designed and there was no substantial impairment to the use, value or safety of this value pursuant to the Lemon Law.

Dodge Neon Owner Representing Themselves Loses Lemon Case – A consumer who was not represented by an attorney lost her lemon case involving a 2003 Dodge Neon purchased from Walsh Dodge-Daewoo in Jersey City, New Jersey, for a total of $16,000. The consumer's initial complaint was made on January 30, 2003, when she brought her car to the dealership complaining of squeaking brakes. She was advised that there was a break-in period in the braking system and no repairs were done.   On April 26, 2003, the consumer took her car in for various maintenance checks and again complained of squeaking brakes. The brakes were checked and the front rotors and rear drums were resurfaced .  The consumer next took her vehicle in for service on August 2, 2003, at which time no brake concerns were noted.  The consumer next took her car in for service on November 15, 2003, for certain maintenance issues and requested again that the brakes be checked. No repairs were made to the brakes on that occasion.   The consumer took her vehicle in for service on February 14, 2004, for various maintenance issues and squeaking brakes.  On that occasion, the squeaking brake noise was detected and a brake service was performed on the front rotors to resolve it.  The consumer brought her car in on April 3, 2004, with the same complaint. She asked that the brake system be replaced, and, as a result, the front brake pads were replaced and the rotors refaced.  The consumer brought her car in on April 30, 2004, again indicating that the brakes were squealing and the rear brake shoes were replaced.   The consumer brought her car in on June 29, 2004, complaining about the brakes. The repair order indicates that the brake inspection found no apparent problems and that the car was safe to drive.   No repairs were made.   At the time of the lemon law hearing, the consumer's car had approximately 17,300 miles on the odometer.   No defect in the braking system was found, and the vehicle had no difficulty stopping. The administrative law judge found that the vehicle made noise when the brakes are applied but that: (1) the vehicle's use has not been affected by the noise; (2) no evidence was offered that the vehicle's safety is decreased by the brake noise; and (3) presented no evidence to support her contention that the vehicle's value is diminished.   Under any objective evaluation, the consumer was unable to sustain a claim for Lemon Law relief because the squeaky brakes cannot reasonably be found to substantially impair the vehicle's value. Her mere subjective belief that the value is diminished is insufficient for the undersigned to find a "substantial impairment of value" as the Lemon Law requires before relief can be given.